encryption

8 pieces

• Content Credentials (C2PA) Explained: What the Label Proves

  Provenance can vouch for what honest sources signed; its absence proves nothing about anything else.

  The c2pa content credentials system allows publishers to cryptographically sign the history of a digital file. This proves origin and edits but fails to detect unlabelled synthetic media. Provenance is a tool for trust, not a universal detector for deception.

  2026-09-14 · technical-essay · 10 min read

• Crossing a Border With Your Phone: How to Prepare Your Devices

  At a border the threat is compelled access, which calls for carrying less rather than encrypting more.

  A border phone search targets compelled access, not theft. Encryption alone fails when you must unlock the device. The effective defence is data minimisation: carry only what you need, keep the rest in accessible accounts, and power down before inspection.

  2026-09-14 · technical-essay · 7 min read

• Will Quantum Computers Break Encryption? What Is Actually at Risk

  Public-key exchange and signatures are exposed; your AES files and hashed passwords mostly are not.

  Popular coverage implies quantum computers will unlock everything, but the realistic exposure is concentrated in public-key algorithms. Symmetric encryption and hashing need larger parameters rather than replacement. The ordinary person's most useful action is keeping software updated rather than worrying.

  2026-09-14 · technical-essay · 8 min read

• Encrypted at Rest Is the Weakest Claim on the Page

  It defends against one specific event, it is nearly universal, and it is presented as though it were the headline

  Almost every service states that data is encrypted at rest. The claim is usually true and protects against a narrow scenario: somebody obtaining the physical medium. Against the threats people are actually worried about, it does approximately nothing, and understanding why clarifies what to look for instead.

  2026-09-12 · technical-essay · 3 min read

• Who Holds the Key

  One question organises almost everything in practical security, and most products answer it without being asked

  Transport encryption, storage encryption, password managers, backups, messaging, biometrics and cloud storage look like separate subjects. They are one question repeated: who is in a position to read this, and what would it take. A single frame for the whole field, and where each common arrangement sits inside it.

  2026-09-12 · technical-essay · 6 min read

• You Cannot Verify the Code You Are Running

  Open source proves what was published, not what was executed, and the gap between those is where trust actually sits

  Published source is treated as evidence that a program does what it claims. It is evidence about a repository. Between that repository and the binary on your machine sit a compiler, a build machine, a distribution channel and an update mechanism, none of which the source describes. What closes parts of the gap, and what remains open.

  2026-09-12 · technical-essay · 4 min read

• Browser-Level Encryption: What the Padlock Does Not Cover

  The difference between a connection nobody can read and a file nobody can read

  TLS protects a file while it moves. It stops protecting it the moment it arrives. This is the distinction between transport encryption, encryption at rest, and end-to-end encryption performed in the browser — stated in terms of who holds the key at each stage, because that is the only question that separates them.

  2026-09-11 · technical-essay · 4 min read

• Who Holds the Key: How files.vualet Differs From Dropbox by Design

  A comparison written while one side of it is still being built, and labelled as such

  Dropbox encrypts files in transit and at rest, and holds the keys that open them. files.vualet is being built so that it cannot. This sets out the architectural difference, separates what is true today from what is intended, and gives the reader the three questions that settle it for any service.

  2026-09-11 · technical-essay · 4 min read